Using DMARC
Why is DMARC failing? Causes and fixes
Updated 29 October 2026 · 7 min read
DMARC fails when a message does not pass SPF or DKIM for a domain that is aligned with the address in its From line. In practice, almost every failure comes down to one of a handful of causes: a service sending on your behalf that authenticates with its own domain, a sender missing from your SPF record, a DKIM signature that did not verify, mail being forwarded, or someone else using your domain. Your DMARC aggregate reports contain the evidence to tell them apart.
How DMARC decides pass or fail
A receiving server checks two things. SPF asks whether the sending server is allowed to send for the domain in the hidden return-path. DKIM checks a cryptographic signature added by the sender. DMARC then asks whether either of those passes for your domain. That last part is alignment, and it is where most failures happen. If you are new to the three standards, start with how DMARC, DKIM and SPF fit together.
The common causes
A service authenticates with its own domain
Marketing platforms, CRMs, helpdesks and invoicing tools often send as your domain but pass SPF or DKIM for their own. The receiver sees a pass, but not for your domain, so DMARC fails. This is the most common cause of DMARC failing when SPF or DKIM passes. The fix is to set up DKIM signing with your own domain in that service, often called domain authentication or a custom sending domain.
The sender is missing from your SPF record
If mail uses your domain as the return-path but comes from a server your SPF record does not list, SPF fails. If you recognise and use the service, add it using the include value from its own setup guide. Watch the ten-lookup limit: four or five services can be enough to push SPF into an error, which fails every message.
A DKIM signature for your domain did not verify
The message was signed with your domain, but the signature failed. Either the key published in your DNS is missing or does not match the one the service uses, or the message was changed after it was signed, for example by a mailing list adding a footer or a security gateway rewriting links. Aggregate reports cannot tell you which, so check the DNS record first.
Strict alignment
If your DMARC record sets adkim=s or aspf=s, a pass for a subdomain such as mail.example.co.uk no longer counts for example.co.uk. Relaxed alignment, the default, accepts it.
Forwarding and mailing lists
Forwarded mail arrives from the forwarder's server, so SPF fails. DKIM usually survives, unless the message is changed on the way. Mail forwarded through a large mailbox provider with nothing passing looks exactly like spoofing from the same provider, and aggregate reports cannot tell the two apart.
Someone else is using your domain
Mail with no authentication for your domain, from sources you do not recognise, is often spoofing. You do not need to authorise this mail. Blocking it is exactly what DMARC is for, and moving your policy towards reject will stop it reaching inboxes. Read how to choose between none, quarantine and reject before you tighten it.
How to find the cause in your reports
Each aggregate report lists sending sources with their SPF and DKIM results, the domains they were checked against, and the receiver's DMARC verdict. Work through the failing sources by volume. Compare the authenticated domains with your From domain to spot alignment problems, and match the sending servers to the services you use. Our guide on how to read a DMARC aggregate report walks through the fields.
Be careful about trust. Anyone can send a report to a public reporting address, so a single report naming a sender is not proof that the sender is yours. Before you authorise anything, make sure you recognise the service and that more than one genuine receiver reports it.
Let DMARCHub do the sorting
DMARCHub reads every receiver's reports and groups failing mail on each domain by likely cause, says how sure it is, shows the evidence, and gives you the steps for that cause. It only suggests approving a sending service when receivers it has confirmed as genuine back that up. On eligible plans you can also ask for a short plain-English summary, written by AI and processed within the EU. See how DMARC failure explanations work.
FAQ
Frequently asked questions
Why does DMARC fail when SPF passes?
SPF checks the hidden envelope sender (the return-path), not the From address people see. If a sending service uses its own domain for the return-path, SPF passes for that domain but is not aligned with yours. DKIM signing with your own domain usually fixes it.
Why does DMARC fail when DKIM passes?
The DKIM signature that passed was probably made with the sending service's own domain rather than yours. DMARC needs a passing DKIM signature from a domain aligned with your From address. Set up DKIM signing with your own domain in the service's settings.
Should I add every failing source to my SPF record?
No. Some failing mail is forwarded, and some is someone else sending as your domain. Only add a service you recognise and actually use, and prefer DKIM signing with your own domain, which survives forwarding where SPF does not.
Can forwarding make DMARC fail?
Yes. When a message is forwarded, it arrives from the forwarding server, which is not in your SPF record, so SPF fails. DKIM usually survives unless the forwarder or a mailing list changes the message. That is why DKIM matters.
DMARCHub turns these reports into a clear picture, hosted in the UK.